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SSPD
Conference

Information Generator: Keeping the Lights on

Sensor Signal Processing for Defence Conference

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7 December 2017

Future Operating Environment: Contested



12 December 2017

Defence Science and Technology

Future Operating Environment: Congested



Future Operating Environment: Information Warfare



12 December 2017

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Future Sensing Capability Risks

Sensor systems: e.g. connected, agile, affordable


Detection: e.g. range, noise, clutter, through barriers

Resilient: e.g. jamming, sensor protection, autonomous

Operating Environment: e.g. urban, blurred boundaries

Data into information: signal processing, analysis, fusion, autonomy

Ensure sensor overmatch for near peer state threat for Intelligence, Platform Survivability and Weapons





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Our S&T Approach

- DST, in Whitehall MOD Main Building, leading MOD S&T
 - Strategy
 - Military User Engagement
 - Research Commissioning
- Dstl leading on delivery of S&T
- International by design
- Investing to maintain S&T capability





Our S&T Approach (2)


- Sensing research will be focussed on 'Driving', characterised by

Speculative

High achievement risk
but often high reward

Strategic


Future opportunities
through User capability
development and growth





Signal Processing in Defence

- Military action fits into 'Joint Action' model
 - Focus today on Information Activities
- For this talk will give Signal Processing examples across
 - Multi-sensor exploitation
 - Single Sensor
 - Sensor Protection





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
Example Signal Processing Challenges



Multi-Sensor Exploitation



Radar Electronic Warfare



Imaging inside buildings



Distributed Electronic
Warfare



Imaging through
Obscurants



Electronic Protection
Measures



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Multi-sensor Exploitation: SAPIENT Project




Raw data channelled to a human analyst



Rely on human cognition for Detection, Threat-assessment and Sensor-management

- Autonomous persistent sensing
- Reduced operator burden
- Flexible / Reconfigurable
- Low cost – reduces requirement for bespoke system design
- Multiple complementary sensor technologies
- **Supplying information rather than raw data to the end user**
- Multi-use over Defence, Civilian, Security domains

SAPIENT proposes a concept of Modular, Autonomous sensor units, sending only low bandwidth processed messages to a fusion centre which performs decision fusion and sensor management.



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SAPIENT: Sensing for Asset Protection with Integrated Electronic Networked Technology



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Multi-sensor Exploitation: SAPIENT Project




Enables a variety of innovations in **High Level Decision Making Module (HLDMM)**

- Bayesian multi-target search algorithm derived from an information theoretic approach
- Data Fusion process tightly integrated with an Trust Model which maintains a model of the real-world performance of each sensor


Enables a variety of innovations in **Autonomous Sensor Modules (ASMs)**

- SVM regression based pedestrian activity estimation
- Radar beamforming
- Scanning Laser Rangefinders (SLRs), providing shape, tracking and description to enable intelligent object recognition

Base protection



Counter UAV





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Multi-sensor Exploitation: What next?



MOD Distributed Sensing and Fusion concepts




Multi-sensor Exploitation: What next?



Distributed Sensors

- Multiple Ad-hoc Sensor Network (MASNET)
 - Numerous sensors networked together
 - Collaboratively detect, position fix and decode signals in an operating environment.
- Key solution to solving many Communication Electronic Surveillance (CES) challenges
- Task about to commence under the University Defence Research Collaboration
- Three phases:
 - Mathematical modelling
 - Simulation and statistical analysis phase
 - Real-world verification and robustness testing phase






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Radar Electronic Warfare



Electronic Warfare is Military action that exploits Electromagnetic energy to provide **Shared Situational Awareness** and achieve **offensive** and **defensive** effects



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
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Cognitive Electronic Warfare



- Some threat radars exhibit **adaptive multifunction behaviour**
- Cognitive EW is likely to:
 - Incorporate **machine learning** algorithms
 - Feature a **short-term** (within mission) and **long-term** (between missions) **memory**
 - **automatically update the rules** that determine how it should operate
- We believe **Cognitive EW** might be able to help us:
 - understand the electromagnetic environment
 - reliably identify modern radar threats
 - adapt to changes made in the threat radar since our last intelligence collection




- If these hypotheses are true, then Cognitive EW will help us to **maintain our ability to penetrate defended areas.**



Thru-wall RF Imaging



A 2D array of radar measurements can be used to form a 3D radar image. Low Frequency (LF) radar penetrates many building materials. Lab-based experiments are being used to assess the performance of 3D image formation algorithms.







Thru-wall RF Imaging: Incomplete data



- It may not be possible to obtain complete 2D array of measurements
- Determining optimum sampling strategies and image formation schemes is a signal processing challenge
- This will allow efficient data gathering to be achieved in contested urban environments
- Look out for the “Bright Sapphire II” open source challenge (EUSAR 2018)

See Electronics Letters, Vol. 53, No. 15 for background on Bright Sapphire II (operated by Airbus) and other thru-wall techniques

Hourglass aperture trajectory & Target scene









Thru-wall RF Imaging: What next?



- Parasitic SAR
 - Remote intelligence from inside a building

One of 8 flight test
Sep 28th 2016





Distributed EW: Challenge




Conventional EW practice

- Deploy a few high performance transceivers standing off from the threat.
- Signal processing focuses on detecting and recognising a signal at each receiver. Post-processing intercept data shared for combined geolocation and Situational Awareness.
- 'Multifunction' equipment time-shares hardware resource – can't jam and monitor simultaneously.

The challenge

- Modern/future communication signals are expected to become increasingly
 - Wide band, low-power, exploit spatial techniques (MIMO, etc.)
 - Systems will dynamically optimise their RF channel to achieve channel capacity
- The conventional techniques are significantly impaired in this environment



Distributed EW systems to combat spatial diversity
in the modern EME



Distributed EW: Role of Signal Processing



EW test bench Novel signal processing will be developed to realise:

Distributed Virtual Arrays

- Applying single platform array processing techniques to distributed platforms to provide :
 - Non-line of sight geolocation in complex RF channel environments
 - Distributed, joint detection and demodulation

Full Duplex EW

- Inhibit Electromagnetic Environment while retain SA by developing advanced signal cancellation techniques.


Military benefits

Required to secure our ability to operate in a modern EM environment

- Detect recognise and locate threats
- Restrict adversary use of EME



Distributed EW test bench



Novel non-line-of-sight geolocation techniques



Imaging Through Obscurants




- Military uses include: Pilotage in degraded visual environments, ISR in fog and rain, and Targeting through cloud
- Single photon counting LIDAR is one potential technology that can detect the small returns from beyond highly scattering media

Successful imaging through smoke - heavy scattering and sparse photons can make the images difficult to interpret, particularly with limited acquisition time


Visible wavelength image




Intensity Image



Depth Image



Signal processing compared for computational efficiency/image quality – showing potential for effective imaging at reduced acquisition time





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Electronic Protection Measures




- Use of EM spectrum is increasing the congestion and unintended conflict (jamming) within the EM environment.
- RF countermeasures create a range of effects in RF sensors e.g. obscuration, seduction, confusion, overloading
- Focus on protecting radar & electronic surveillance systems from deliberate/unintentional interference
- One approach is signal processing: alternative/parallel pulse compression & CFAR, methods to detect characteristics of false targets e.g. blind separation





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Novel S&T Approaches **UDRC Phase 3:** Signal processing in the information age



Signal processing on large, multidimensional data

- Needles in multidimensional haystacks (and needle stacks)
- Data with high and asymmetric uncertainty
- Non-traditional correlation
- Assessing the information content of complex data


High-volume Signal Processing

- Anomaly, outlier and correlation discovery.
- Fleeting and highly non-stationary signals
- Non-centralised and pipeline processing
- Verification of machine-learned models in other domains/scenarios


Challenges of the 'Information Age'

- Management of very different types of uncertainty
- "Hyper-fusion" – Data fusion writ large
- Automated structure discovery
- Resource constrained sensor management
- Trust and provenance of information sources

"Stone Soup"




Open Source framework for Tracking and State Estimation



Information Generator: Keeping the Lights on

1. To keep the “lights on” we need an information generator
2. The Information generator requires collection of data and signal processing
3. MOD needs access to world class ideas, algorithms and technology

Questions?



Thank you to Dstl MOD colleagues for the S&T examples in this brief:

Paul Thomas, Tristan Goss, Sam Docx, Phil Soan, David Blacknell, Darren Muff, Andrew May, Simon Zavad and Helen Carlton

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